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Abstract 
Water scarcity is a critical environmental issue worldwide, especially in arid and 
semiarid regions. In those regions, climate change projections suggest further reductions 
in freshwater supplies and increases of the recurrence, longevity and intensity of 
drought events. At present, one important question for policy debate is the identification 
of water management policies that could address the mounting water scarcity problems. 
Suitable policies should improve economic efficiency, achieve environmental 
sustainability, and meet equity needs. This paper applies an integrated hydro-economic 
model that links a reduced form hydrological component, with economic and 
environmental components to such issues. The model is used to make a direct 
comparison of three water management alternatives, water markets, water pricing and 
institutional policies, based on their economic, environmental and equity outcomes. The 
analysis is performed in the Jucar Basin of Spain, which is a good natural experiment 
for studying the policies to confront water scarcity and climate change. Results indicate 
that both institutional and water market policies are good instruments to smooth the 
economic damage costs of droughts, achieving almost the same social benefits. 
However, the environmental effects of water markets are worrying. Another important 
finding is that water pricing is the worst policy option not only in terms of private and 
environmental benefits but also in terms of equity. 
 
Keywords. Water scarcity, Climate change, Water policies, Hydro-economic modeling, 
Economic and environmental benefits 
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1. Introduction   
Water scarcity and water quality degradation are becoming widespread problems in 
most regions around the world. The reasons are the large increase in global water 
extractions in the last century from 600 to 3,900 km3 driven by the intensive growth of 
population and income, coupled with a questionable performance of water governance 
and policies. The degradation of water resources is a threat to human water security and 
environmental biodiversity around the world, which so far has been addressed by large 
investments to ensure human security in medium and high income countries. However, 
the threats to natural ecosystems are hardly accounted for (Vörösmarty et al., 2010). 
The massive ecosystem damages in basins such as Ganges, Indus, Nile, Yellow, 
Yangtze, Amu and Syr Darya, Tigris, Euphrates, Murray-Darling, Colorado and Rio 
Grande call for a reconsideration of the water institutions and policies used at present. 
The need for such reform is not only for protecting ecosystems, but also to substitute the 
escalating investments that ensure human security for better water management options.  
The scale of the global growing overexploitation indicates that water 
mismanagement is quite common, and that sustainable management of basins is a 
complex and difficult task. At first, water scarcity resulted from surface extractions, but 
recently it is worsening because of the unprecedented depletion of groundwater brought 
about by falling pumping costs. Between 1960 and 2000, groundwater extractions rose 
from 310 to 730 km3 per year pushing depletion up to 150 km3 (Konikow, 2011). This 
staggering annual depletion ranges from 50 km3 in the Indus-Ganges-Brahmaputra 
region to 24 km3 in the USA, 13 km3 in the Tigris-Euphrates region, and 9 km3 in 
Northern China (NASA GRACE data estimations). 
Water scarcity is increased gradually by the decisions on water extractions in river 
basins linked to land use and economic activities. The problems arising from water 
scarcity could become critical during drought periods. Climate change is projected to 
aggravate the severity and recurrence of drought events, especially in arid and semiarid 
regions (IPCC, 2014). In those regions, the combined effects of human-induced 
permanent water scarcity and climate change-induced droughts portend unprecedented 
levels of water resources degradation.  
The sustainable management of water is quite challenging because of the different 
types of goods and services provided by water. These goods and services can be 
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classified as private goods, common pool resources, or public goods, depending on the 
degree of exclusion and rivalry in consumption among consumers. Treated drinkable 
water in urban networks is close to a private good (rivalry & exclusion), water in 
surface watercourses and aquifers is close to a common pool resource (rivalry & non-
exclusion), while water sustaining ecosystems comes close to a public good (non-rivalry 
& non-exclusion) (Booker et al., 2012). The management of water is governed by 
public policies because pure competitive markets fail to account for the common pool 
and public good characteristics of water.  
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the ongoing policy discussion to 
address water scarcity and droughts. A hydro-economic model of the Jucar basin in 
Spain is used to make a direct comparison of policies based on their economic, 
environmental and equity effects. Three policy alternatives are considered: (1) an 
institutional approach based on stakeholders’ cooperation; (2) a water market policy; 
and (3) a water pricing policy. The assessment of the three policies provides 
information to stakeholders and decision makers about the tradeoffs between the 
policies in the allocation of water among sectors and locations. The paper is organized 
as follows. First, the three types of water policies are reviewed in section 2. Then, the 
Jucar River Basin is presented in section 3. Section 4 describes the modeling 
framework, and section 5 presents the drought and policy scenarios and the simulation 
results. Section 6 concludes with the summary and policy implications. 
2. Types of policy instruments 
Economic theory offers three types of policy instruments that could account for the 
market externalities created by the common pool and public good characteristics of 
water. The first type is the “Pigou solution”, which is based on taxation of water 
extractions (Pigou, 1920). This is the water pricing approach that is being implemented 
in the European Water Framework Directive (WFD) (EC, 2012). The second type is the 
“Coase solution”, which is based on privatizing the resource and trading (Coase, 1960). 
This is the water market approach that has been implemented in Australia (NWC, 
2011). The third type is the common property governance (Ostrom, 1990), based on the 
evidence that coercive government rules fail because they lack legitimacy and 
knowledge of local conditions. This is the institutional approach, where stakeholders 
themselves have to design the rules and enforcement mechanisms for the sustainable 
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management of common resources (Ostrom et al., 1999), although this approach has 
been mostly ignored by water authorities. 
Mainstream water policies in some countries derive from the Dublin Statement on 
Water, which declares water an economic good (ICWE, 1992), and are based on so-
called economic instruments such as water markets or water pricing. Besides the 
European Union and Australia, both water pricing and water markets are being 
considered at present for solving the acute water scarcity problems in China (Che & 
Shang, 2015). 
These economic instruments work well when water exhibits private good 
characteristics such as in urban networks, but not so well when water exhibits common 
pool resource or public good characteristics. There is a strong consensus among experts 
that water pricing could achieve sizable gains in efficiency and welfare in urban and 
industrial water networks (Hanemann, 1997), although implementation could face 
technical and political difficulties. Irrigation water from surface watercourses and 
aquifers exhibits common pool resource characteristics, and the use of economic 
instruments requires transforming the resource into a private good. This transformation 
is quite difficult, especially in arid and semiarid regions under strong water scarcity 
pressures, and would require the support of stakeholders. 
Irrigated agriculture is the largest user of water in most arid and semiarid regions, 
and plays an important role in sustaining rural livelihoods and ecosystems. During 
drought spells, the adjustments to the shortfall of water supply in basins fall mainly on 
irrigation activities, which consequently trigger considerable economic and 
environmental impacts, and social conflicts. One important question for future policy 
debates is the identification of potential water management policies in irrigation. 
Suitable policies should improve economic efficiency, achieve environmental 
sustainability, and address equity within contexts of scarcity, droughts and climate 
change. The debate here deals with the relative efficacy of the different approaches to 
allocate water in irrigation, including water pricing, water markets and institutional 
mechanisms.  
Water pricing in irrigation, to achieve water conservation, has been the subject of 
debate since the 1990s. A string of the literature finds that irrigation water pricing has 
limited effects on water conservation (Moore, 1991; Sheierling et al., 2004), and some 
5 
 
authors indicate that water markets seem far more effective than water pricing for 
allocating irrigation water (Cornish et al., 2004). In contrast, Tsur et al. (2004) indicate 
that water pricing could achieve an efficient allocation of irrigation water. 
In recent decades, the water market approach has been gaining ground in some 
parts of the world to allocate water in irrigation such as in Australia and Chile. Previous 
studies in the literature consider that water trading is a flexible and efficient way to 
address water allocation problems (Easter et al., 1998; Connor et al., 2009; Howitt et al., 
2012). These studies indicate that water markets may increase water use efficiency, 
avoid the development of new costly water resources, and achieve significant welfare 
gains by reallocating water from crops with low to high marginal value of water. 
Numerous pre-requisites are needed for the design of well-functioning water markets 
such as the definition of water rights, the creation of legal and institutional frameworks 
for trade, and investments in infrastructure to facilitate water transfer (Dinar et al., 
1997).  
The Murray-Darling Basin is at present the most active water market in the world, 
and during the drought of 2002-2012 this market has generated benefits in the range of 
several hundred million to 1 billion US dollars per year (Connor & Kaczan, 2013). A 
challenge to water markets are the third party effects such as environmental impacts, 
which would reduce the benefits of trading. Water markets reduce streamflows because 
previously unused water allocations are traded, and also because gains in irrigation 
efficiency at parcel level reduce drainage and return flows to the environment 
downstream. This reduction in basin return flows has been analyzed both in Australia 
and the U.S. (Qureshi et al., 2010; Howe et al., 1986). Another worrying effect is the 
large surge in groundwater extractions, as shown in the last drought in the Murray-
Darling.1 The choice in Australia has been to mostly ignore the third party impacts of 
water markets (Connor & Kaczan, 2013). 
Medellín et al. (2013) estimate very large potential gains from water trading under 
droughts or climate change in California. These gains in the Central Valley of 
California are estimated at 1.4 billion US dollars. However, implementing these 
potential gains from trading is quite a challenge as the failure of the Water Bank 
                                                            
1 Blewett (2012) indicates that extractions between 2002 and 2007 were seven times above the allowed 
limits placed on groundwater users. 
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Figure 1. Map of the Jucar River Basin. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
experience in the 2009 drought shows. Water transfers were blocked by the water 
exporting regions and environmentalist NGOs (Medellín et al., 2013). The attainment of 
this solution seems to require stronger institutions, involving stakeholders’ cooperation.  
In Spain, the approach to water management is based on institutional arrangements 
and relies on the river basin authorities (CHE, 2008). The basin authorities are 
responsible for water management, water allocation, control and enforcement, planning 
and waterworks. The special feature of this institutional arrangement is the key role 
played by stakeholders in managing the basin authority.  
Stakeholders are part of the basin authorities, taking decisions in the basin 
governing bodies and in local watershed boards, and they are involved at all levels of 
decision making: planning, financing, waterworks, measures design, enforcement, and 
water management. The management of water is decentralized, with the basin 
authorities in charge of water allocation, and water user associations in charge of 
secondary infrastructure and water usage. The main advantage of this institutional 
setting is that stakeholders cooperate in the design and enforcement of decisions, rules 
and regulations, and therefore the implementation and enforcement processes are 
carried on smoothly (Albiac et al. 2013). 
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Table 1. Water use by sector and origin in the JRB in a normal flow year (Mm3). 
Origin Agriculture Urban Industrial Total 
Surface water  761 118 24 903 
Groundwater 633 104 25 762 
Reuse 11 0 1 12 
Total 1,405 222 50 1,677 
Source. CHJ 2009.  
Therefore, water allocation relies on the cooperation of stakeholders in basin 
authorities. Although water management in Spain is far from perfect, there have been 
recent mounting signs of successful experiences in the case of the La Mancha aquifers 
(Esteban & Albiac, 2012), where aquifer extractions have been curbed through 
stakeholders’ cooperation.  
3. The Jucar River Basin  
The Jucar River Basin (JRB) is located in the regions of Valencia and Castilla-La 
Mancha in Eastern Spain. It extends over 22,300 Km2 and covers the area drained by 
the Jucar River and its tributaries mainly the Magro and the Cabriel Rivers (Figure 1). 
The basin has an irregular Mediterranean hydrology, characterized by recurrent drought 
spells and normal years with dry summers. 
The JRB renewable water resources are nearly 1,700 Mm3/year but water 
extractions are very close to renewable resources, 1,680 Mm3, and the basin is almost a 
closed water system. The main water use is irrigated agriculture with 1,400 Mm3, 
followed by urban and industrial uses of 270 Mm3, which supply households, industries, 
and services of more than one million inhabitants (Table 1). There are also non-
consumptive uses for hydropower, aquaculture and recreation. 
The irrigated area extends over 190,000 ha, and the main crops grown are rice, 
wheat, barley, garlic, lettuce, grapes, and citrus. There are three major irrigation areas 
located in the upper Jucar, the lower Jucar, and the bordering area of the Turia basin. 
The Eastern La Mancha irrigation area (EM) is located in the upper Jucar, covering 
100,000 ha. The irrigation districts of Acequia Real del Jucar (ARJ), Escalona y 
Carcagente (ESC), and Ribera Baja (RB) are in the lower Jucar, with an area of 35,000 
ha. The irrigation district of Canal Jucar-Turia (CJT) is located in the bordering Turia 
basin with an area of 22,000 ha (Table 2).  
The expansion of water extractions in the basin and the severe drought spells in 
recent decades have triggered considerable negative environmental and economic  
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Table 2. The main water users in the JRB. 
Water users Water use (Mm
3) 
Surface water Groundwater Total 
City of Albacete 17 0 17 
EM aquifer irrigation district 13 386 399 
Nuclear central of Cofrentes 14 0 14 
City of Valencia 95 0 95 
City of Sagunto 8 0 8 
CJT irrigation district 70 91 161 
ARJ irrigation district 213 0 213 
ESC irrigation district 38 0 38 
RB irrigation district 254 0 254 
Other uses 193 285 478 
Total JRB 915 762 1,677 
Source. CHJ 2009.  
 
impacts. The growth of water extractions in recent decades has been driven especially 
by subsurface irrigation from the EM aquifer. The aquifer depletion, combined with 
other important water extractions in the basin, and the recurrent drought spells have 
caused the water flows in the Jucar River to diminish. Environmental flows are 
dwindling in many parts of the basin, resulting in serious damages to water-dependent 
ecosystems. There have been negative impacts on the downstream water users. For 
instance, the water available to the ARJ district has fallen from 700 to 200 Mm3 in the 
last 40 years. Consequently, the dwindling return flows from the irrigation districts in 
the lower Jucar have caused serious environmental problems to the Albufera wetland, 
which is mostly fed by these return flows (Garcia-Molla et al., 2013).  
The Albufera wetland is the main aquatic ecosystem in the JRB. It is a fresh-water 
lagoon included in the RAMSAR list, and was declared a special protected area for 
birds. The Albufera receives water from the return flows of the irrigation districts in the 
lower Jucar, mainly from the ARJ and the RB irrigation districts, and other flows 
originate from discharges of untreated and treated urban and industrial wastewaters. 
There is an important water quality problem driven by deficiencies in the sewage 
disposal and treatment systems in the adjacent municipalities, and by the reduced flows 
originating from the Jucar River that used to improve the quality of wastewater 
discharges (Sanchis, 2011). 
The increased frequency and intensity of drought spells during recent decades has 
been addressed by the Jucar basin authority with investments in several long-term 
adaptation measures, such as construction of storage and regulation facilities, 
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improvement of water efficiency through investment in irrigation systems, and 
installation of metering devices and special groundwater monitoring programs to 
control groundwater extractions. 
 
4. The Modeling Framework 
The comparison of policies is based on the hydro-economic model developed in Kahil 
et al. (2015). The model includes three components: (1) a reduced form hydrological 
sub-model; (2) a regional economic sub-model consisting on irrigation districts and 
urban centers; and (3) an environmental benefit sub-model. The reduced form 
hydrological sub-model is used to link the different components of the river basin and to 
simulate the spatial hydrological impacts of droughts. The mathematical formulation of 
the reduced form hydrological sub-model is as follows: 
      ܹ݋ݑݐௗ ൌ ܹ݅݊ௗ െ ܹ݈݋ݏݏௗ െ ܦ݅ݒௗூோ െ ܦ݅ݒௗ௎ோ஻                                                   [1] 
       ܹ݅݊ௗାଵ ൌ ܹ݋ݑݐௗ ൅ ݎௗூோ · ሺܦ݅ݒௗூோሻ ൅ ݎௗ௎ோ஻ · ሺܦ݅ݒௗ௎ோ஻ሻ ൅ ܴܱௗାଵ                       [2] 
         ܹ݋ݑݐௗ ൒ ܧௗ௠௜௡                                                                                                     [3] 
where equations [1], [2] and [3] are the mass balance, the flow continuity, and the 
minimum-environmental flow constraints, respectively. These constraints determine the 
water available in the different river reaches that can be used for economic activities 
after considering the environmental restrictions. ܹ݋ݑݐௗ is the water outflow from a 
river reach d; ܹ݅݊ௗ the water inflow to d; ܹ݈݋ݏݏௗ the loss of water in d; ܦ݅ݒௗூோ the 
water diversion to irrigation districts located in d; ܦ݅ݒௗ௎ோ஻ the water diversion to urban 
and industrial activities located in d; ܹ݅݊ௗାଵ the water inflow to the next river reach 
݀ ൅ 1; ሾݎௗூோ · ሺܦ݅ݒௗூோሻሿ the return flows from irrigation districts; ሾݎௗ௎ோ஻ · ሺܦ݅ݒௗ௎ோ஻ሻሿ the 
return flows from urban and industrial activities; ܴܱௗାଵ the runoff entering river reach 
݀ ൅ 1 from tributaries; and ܧௗ௠௜௡ the minimum environmental flow established for each 
river reach. 
The regional economic sub-model accounts for the decision processes made by 
irrigation water users in the five major irrigation districts (EM, CJT, ARJ, ESC, and 
RB) and by urban users in the three main cities (Valencia, Albacete, and Sagunto). A 
farm-level programming component has been developed for each irrigation district, 
which maximizes farmers’ private benefits from irrigation activities by choosing a crop 
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mix subject to various technical and resource constraints. A Leontief production 
function technology is assumed with fixed input and output prices, in which farmers are 
price takers. The optimization problem is given by the following formulation: 
  ܯܽݔ ܤ௞ூோ ൌ ∑ ܥ௜௝௞′ · ௜ܺ௝௞௜௝                                                                                     [4]  
subject to 
         ∑ ௜ܺ௝௞௜ ൑ ݈ܶܽ݊݀௞௝                                                                                                [5] 
         ∑ ௜ܹ௝௞௜௝ · ௜ܺ௝௞ ൑ ܶݓܽݐ݁ݎ௞                                                                                    [6] 
         ∑ ܮ௜௝௞௜௝ · ௜ܺ௝௞ ൑ ݈ܾܶܽ݋ݎ௞                                                                                      [7] 
         ௜ܺ௝௞ ൒ 0                                                                                                                 [8] 
where ܤ௞ூோ is farmers’ private benefits in irrigation district ݇. ܥ௜௝௞′  is a vector of 
coefficients of net income per hectare of crop i using irrigation technology j. The net 
income of each crop is equal to revenue minus direct and indirect costs, and 
amortizations. The decision variable in the optimization problem is ௜ܺ௝௞, corresponding 
to the area of crop ݅ using irrigation technology ݆. Crops are aggregated into three 
representative crop groups: cereals, vegetables, and fruit trees. Irrigation technologies 
are flood, sprinkler, and drip.  
Constraint [5] represents the available area for irrigation equipped with technology 
݆ in irrigation district ݇, ݈ܶܽ݊݀௞௝. The water constraint [6] represents irrigation water 
availability in irrigation district ݇, ܶݓܽݐ݁ݎ௞, that depends on surface and subsurface 
water extractions for that district. Parameter ௜ܹ௝௞ is gross water requirements per 
hectare of each crop ݅ using irrigation technology ݆. The labor constraint [7] represents 
labor availability in irrigation district ݇, ݈ܾܶܽ݋ݎ௞. Parameter ܮ௜௝௞ is labor requirements 
per hectare of crop ݅ using irrigation technology ݆. 
For urban water uses, an economic surplus optimization scheme has been 
developed for each city in the basin. The optimization problem maximizes social 
surplus given by the consumer and producer surplus from water use in each city, subject 
to several physical and institutional constraints. The optimization problem is:  
ܯܽݔ ܤ௨௎ோ஻ ൌ ቀܽௗ௨ · ܳௗ௨ െ ଵଶ · ܾௗ௨ · ܳௗ௨ଶ െ ܽ௦௨ · ܳ௦௨ െ
ଵ
ଶ · ܾ௦௨ · ܳ௦௨ଶ ቁ                          [9] 
subject to 
            ܳௗ௨ െ ܳ௦௨ ൑ 0                                                                                                  [10] 
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             ܳௗ௨, ܳ௦௨ ൒ 0                                                                                                    [11] 
where ܤ௨௎ோ஻ is the consumer and producer surplus of city u. Variables Qdu and Qsu are 
water demand and supply by/to the city u, respectively. Parameters adu and bdu are the 
intercept and slope of the inverse demand function, while parameters asu and bsu are the 
intercept and slope of the water supply function. Equation [10] states that supply must 
be greater than or equal to demand. The quantity supplied, Qsu, is the connecting 
variable between urban use optimization components and the reduced form hydrological 
sub-model.  
The environmental benefits sub-model accounts for the environmental benefits 
generated by the main aquatic ecosystem in the JRB, the Albufera wetland. The sub-
model considers only water inflows to the Albufera wetland originated from irrigation 
return flows of the downstream ARJ and RB irrigation districts. Inflows and benefits of 
the Albufera wetland are given by the following expressions: 
     ܧ஺௟௕௨௙௘௥௔ ൌ ߙ · ݎ஺ோ௃ூோ · ൫ܦ஺ோ௃ூோ ൯ ൅ ߚ · ݎோ஻ூோ · ሺܦோ஻ூோ ሻ                                             [12] 
      ܤ஺௟௕௨௙௘௥௔ ൌ ቐ
   ߩଵ · ܧ஺௟௕௨௙௘௥௔           ݂݅  0 ൑ ܧ஺௟௕௨௙௘௥௔ ൑ ܧଵ
ߜଶ ൅ ߩଶ · ܧ஺௟௕௨௙௘௥௔     ݂݅  ܧଵ ൏ ܧ஺௟௕௨௙௘௥௔ ൑ ܧଶ
ߜଷ ൅ ߩଷ · ܧ஺௟௕௨௙௘௥௔                 ݂݅ ܧ஺௟௕௨௙௘௥௔ ൐ ܧଶ
                     [13] 
where equation [12] determines the quantity of water flowing to the Albufera wetland, 
ܧ஺௟௕௨௙௘௥௔. Parameters α and β represent the shares of return flows that feed the wetland 
from the ARJ and RB irrigation districts, respectively. The products [ݎ஺ோ௃ூோ · ሺܦ஺ோ௃ூோ ሻ] and 
[ݎோ஻ூோ · ሺܦோ஻ூோ )] are return flows from the ARJ and RB irrigation districts, respectively.  
Equation [13] represents economic environmental benefits, ܤ஺௟௕௨௙௘௥௔, from the 
ecosystem services that the Albufera wetland provides to society. The environmental 
benefit function is assumed to be a piecewise linear function of water inflows, 
ܧ஺௟௕௨௙௘௥௔, to the wetland. This function expresses shifts in the ecosystem status when 
critical thresholds of water inflows E1 and E2 are reached, following the approach of 
Scheffer et al. (2001). The reason is that ecosystems do not always respond smoothly to 
changes in environmental conditions, and they may switch abruptly to a contrasting 
alternative state for certain critical levels. Time series data of various hydrological and 
chemical indicators have been collected to characterize the ecosystem health status of 
the wetland (CHJ, 2009), along with economic valuation studies of the Albufera and 
other wetlands (Del Saz & Perez, 1999; Woodward & Wui, 2001; Brander et al., 2006). 
12 
 
The specification and estimation of the environmental benefit function is described in 
Kahil et al. (2015).   
Detailed information on the technical coefficients and parameters of the hydro-
economic model has been collected from field surveys, expert consultation, statistics, 
and reviewing the literature (GV, 2009; GCLM, 2009; INE, 2009; CHJ, 2009 and 2012; 
MARM, 2010). This information covers water inflows to the basin, water diversion to 
users, urban water prices and costs, efficiency of primary and secondary conveyance 
channels, crop yields and prices, subsidies, production costs, amortizations, crop water 
requirements, crop labor requirements, land and labor availability, and groundwater 
extractions.  
5. Comparison of water policies  
The hydro-economic model is used to analyze the economic and environmental effects 
of the three alternative water policies designed to cope with scarcity and drought: the 
current institutional arrangement of the basin authority, water markets, and water 
pricing. The model provides results on the private benefits of users, environmental 
benefits, water use and return flows, and inflows to the Albufera wetland. Social 
benefits are assumed to be the sum of the private benefits from irrigation and urban use, 
and the environmental benefits (Table 3).  
Two drought scenarios are considered, mild drought and severe drought. The 
reduction of water inflows over normal levels is 22 percent for mild droughts, and 66 
percent for severe droughts. More information on the characterization of drought 
scenarios can be found in Kahil et al. (2015). The model simulates the outcomes of the 
three alternative policies to deal with these two drought scenarios. 
Institutional cooperation is the baseline policy, and represents the current water 
management to cope with scarcity and droughts. This approach entails flexible adaptive 
changes in water allocations based on the negotiation and cooperation of users. The 
special feature of this approach is the involvement of water stakeholders in the decision 
making process, including the environmental concerns. The water allocations that result 
from cooperation are observed in the data from both normal and drought periods.  
The water market policy opens up water trading between economic agents in 
irrigation districts and urban centers. Economic theory predicts that water markets  
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Table 3. Policies under drought scarcity: institutional, water markets, and water pricing.  
Drought Scenario Normal Year Mild Drought Severe Drought 
Type of 
Water Policy 
Current situation 
(Cooperation) Cooperation 
Water markets 
and 
Water pricing 
Cooperation Water markets andWater pricing 
Water Use (Mm3) 
  Irrigation districts 1030 908 908 683 683 
    EM 399 359 363 304 316 
    CJT 155 132 150 107 146 
    ARJ 200 180 197 131 185 
    ESC 33 30 32 18 31 
    RB 243 207 166 123 4 
  Urban use  119 105 105 74 74 
 Environmental flows 
   (inflows to Albufera) 60 52 50 34 29 
 Private and Environmental Benefits (million Euros)    
    Current situation (Cooperation) Cooperation 
Water 
markets
Water 
pricing Cooperation 
Water 
markets 
Water 
pricing 
Private benefits    
  Irrigation districts  190 171 175 93 136 148 54 
    EM             80 72 72 37 61 62 31 
    CJT 45 40 42 33 36 39 17 
    ARJ 34 31 32 17 23 25 4 
    ESC 7 7 7 5 4 5 2 
    RB 24 21 22 1 12 17 0 
  Urban use 283 276 276 276 241 241 241 
Total 473 447 451 369 377 389 295 
Environmental benefits 75 37 32 32 22 19 19 
Social benefits 548 484 483 401 399 408 314 
(Top) Water allocations to irrigation, urban use and environment in million cubic meters. (Bottom) 
Private benefits from irrigation and urban use, and environmental benefits in million Euros. 
 
achieve welfare gains by reallocating water from low to high marginal values of water, 
and this efficient use of water maximizes the private benefits of agents. The model is 
used to test the water market policy alternative, and empirically estimate the market 
potential welfare gains. Water trade becomes more pronounced as drought severity 
intensifies, reaching 120 Mm3 under severe drought. The main effect is the 
improvement of irrigation efficiency, but also the subsequent fall in irrigation return 
flows up to 19 Mm3 which further reduce the environmental flows in the basin. 
The water pricing policy achieves also the efficient use of water by adjusting water 
prices to balance water demand with the available water supply during drought. This 
policy alternative is in line with the water pricing policy advocated by the European 
Water Framework Directive, reiterated in the recent Blueprint to Safeguard Europe's 
Water Resources (EC, 2012). Water prices in each irrigation district and urban center 
are set equal to the marginal value of water at the efficient level of water use, which is 
the market-clearing price. One advantage of the water pricing policy is that it assures 
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the financial viability of the public and private water agencies responsible for water 
supply, which could guarantee its operation without the need of public subsidies.  
Social benefits under the institutional or baseline policy in normal flow conditions 
amount to 548 million Euros. Private benefits are 190 million Euros for irrigation and 
283 million for urban demand, from using 1,030 and 119 Mm3 of water, respectively. 
Environmental benefits provided by the Albufera wetland are 75 million Euros, and the 
Albufera wetland receives 60 Mm3 of return flows from the ARJ and RB irrigation 
districts, which support the ecological status of the wetland.  
5.1 Mild drought scenario  
Mild drought events reduce social benefits by 65 million Euros under the institutional 
and water market policies, but the social benefit losses go up to 150 million Euros under 
water pricing. The environmental losses are close to 40 million Euros under all policies, 
cutting environmental benefits by half. The difference among policies is the irrigation 
losses, which are below 20 million under institutional and water market policies, but 
escalate to 100 million under water pricing. Therefore the staggering benefit losses from 
the water pricing policy are driven by the large impact of pricing on irrigation profits.  
The environment sustains significant benefit losses derived from the reduction of 
water inflows to the Albufera. These water inflows under water markets and water 
pricing fall below the critical threshold E1, creating a regime shift in the wetland. The 
institutional policy achieves higher environmental benefits because it allocates more 
water to the Albufera, avoiding further desiccation and ecosystems degradation. 
The effects on the urban sector are moderate both in terms of water allocations and 
private benefits. The reason is the priority rules under the institutional policy, and also 
the availability of additional water sources at higher costs from neighboring basins in 
the case of Valencia and Sagunto (Turia basin), or groundwater in the case of Albacete.  
 Farmers face diminishing water extractions from drought and reduce crop acreage, 
mostly of cereals because these are the less profitable crops. The allocation of irrigation 
water to the RB, ARJ and CJT districts changes between the institutional and water 
market policies. Water markets allocate 40 Mm3 less water to RB, and this water is 
assigned to ARJ and CJT. These water exchanges are driven by the differences among 
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water shadow prices in districts. However, the private benefits of all irrigation districts 
are almost the same under both the institutional and water market policies.  
The opportunity costs of policies for farmers are the benefit losses sustained under 
each policy. A steep increase in the opportunity costs of a particular policy would be 
met by opposition from farmers leading to policy failure, given that other feasible 
policies are less costly. The costs of the water pricing policy are very high for farmers 
compared to the institutional or water market policies, with irrigation benefits falling by 
half when water pricing is implemented instead of the other policies. Opposition to the 
water pricing policy would be strong in the RB, EM and ARJ districts, where the 
opportunity costs of implementing water pricing are especially damaging to farmers. 
This empirical finding shows that the institutional and water market policy options are 
much more feasible and equitable than water pricing, because water pricing involves 
disproportionate costs to farmers. 
5.2 Severe drought scenario  
The effects of severe drought are more pronounced than those of mild drought, although 
they show similar patterns. The fall in social benefits is almost 150 million Euros under 
the institutional and water market policies, but social benefits losses escalate to almost 
250 million under water pricing. Environmental benefits sustain quite large losses, 
although the institutional policy allocates slightly more inflows to the Albufera. 
The irrigation benefits by district are almost the same under the institutional and 
water market policies, and the main difference is the change in water allocation to the 
RB, ARJ and CJT districts. Compared to the institutional policy, water markets respond 
to the shadow prices of water. Water trading allocates more water to the ARJ, ESC, EM 
and CJT districts by reducing the allocation of the RB district by 120 Mm3. 
Choosing the water pricing policy under severe drought is quite detrimental to 
farmers. The implementation of water pricing instead of the institutional or water 
market policies, make farmers lose two thirds of their private profits. In districts such as 
RB and ARJ, the private benefits of farmers are almost entirely wiped out. The 
opportunity costs for farmers of the water pricing policy are disproportionate.  
The cost distribution of confronting a severe drought in the Jucar basin by the 
irrigation, urban and environmental sectors depends on the policy selected by decision 
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makers, and these costs are given by the benefit losses incurred by each sector. These 
costs are 42 million Euros for the urban sector (283-241) and 53 million for the 
environment (75-22) regardless of the policy chosen, but these costs triple from 50 
million Euros (190-140) to almost 150 million (190-54) for the irrigation sector by 
selecting the water pricing policy instead of the other policies. 
5.3 Additional measures to protect the environment 
The environmental flows, especially during droughts, are a major concern in almost all 
basins in arid and semiarid regions. In these basins, regulators face a challenge to 
enforce environmental flows not only because they have to control surface and 
subsurface extractions, but also because the irrigation returns component of 
environmental flows is even more difficult to regulate than water extractions. Examples 
of these management difficulties include basins where water management efforts are 
quite sophisticated, such as the Jucar basin in Spain, the Murray-Darling basin in 
Australia, and the Central Valley in California.2  
Two additional measures are considered for the JRB to protect environmental 
flows, one associated to water markets and the other to the institutional policy. The first 
measure follows the example of the Murray-Darling basin, where a very expensive 
program is being implemented to recover water for the environment using a public 
water buyback program. This seems to be a suitable policy to reap the private benefits 
of pure water markets while protecting ecosystems, and this is called the environmental 
water market. The second measure is to improve the current institutional stakeholder 
cooperation in Jucar, by including the environment as a full stakeholder. These 
augmented environmental flows are achieved by the negotiation among all economic 
and environmental stakeholders, which is called the sustainable institutional policy.   
Both the environmental water market and the sustainable institutional policies 
achieve large gains in environmental benefits, above 200 Million Euros in mild and 
severe droughts, with social benefits in the basin reaching around 730 million Euros 
under mild drought and 660 million Euros under severe drought (See Kahil et al., 2013 
and 2015, for details).     
                                                            
2 In the Jucar, there was a desiccation of the Jucar riverbed during the last drought. In the Murray-Darling 
basin groundwater depletion reached 104 km3 during the last drought (Blewett 2012). In the Central 
Valley of California groundwater depletion has reached 80 km3 during the current drought (UCCHM, 
2014).  
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6. Conclusion  
The increasing pressures on water resources from economic and population growth are 
aggravating water scarcity problems worldwide, which result in serious damages to 
valuable water-dependent ecosystems. Climate change is also becoming a disruptive 
driver of the water cycle, contributing to worsening water scarcity in arid and semiarid 
regions. The sustainable use of water resources requires a reliable understanding of the 
main processes, an accurate assessment of impacts, and improving management by 
stakeholders and governance by policy makers to deal with water scarcity, droughts and 
climate change. Sound management and governance is quite a challenge because of the 
different types of goods and services provided by water, which could be private goods, 
common pool resources, and public goods. 
This paper presents an empirical assessment of three water policy instruments to 
address water scarcity and droughts: water pricing, water markets, and common 
property governance. A direct comparison of the three policies is made by using a 
hydro-economic model of the Jucar basin in Spain, analyzing the economic and 
environmental effects of each policy. 
Water pricing and water markets are economic instruments that work well when 
water is a private good, but less well when water is a common pool resource or public 
good. Studies in California and Australia demonstrate the large gains of water markets, 
both potential gains in California (Howitt et al., 2012; Medellín et al., 2013) and real 
gains in Australia (Connor & Kaczan, 2013).  
We present evidence from Spain because the policy approach is institutional, with a 
strong tradition of cooperation among stakeholders in water user associations dating 
back centuries. Evidence from Spain regarding policy instruments is derived from the 
Jucar basin, where water markets, water pricing, and institutional policies are simulated 
under drought. 
The empirical results highlight that both institutional and water market policies are 
good instruments to smooth the economic damage costs of droughts, achieving similar 
social benefits in terms of private and environmental benefits. This finding is important 
because it shows that in the case of Jucar, the institutional policy can attain almost the 
same private benefits as water markets. 
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The advantages of water markets compared to the institutional policy are a slight 
reduction in land fallowing, a small improvement in irrigation efficiency, and a more 
evenly distribution of drought losses among irrigation districts, thus addressing equity 
concerns. Water markets achieve the optimal private benefits but disregard the 
environmental benefits. Results show that water markets entail a reduction of water for 
environmental purposes, causing faster ecosystem regime shifts compared to the current 
institutional setting. The reason is the public good characteristic of environmental flows 
which are external to markets, leading to excessive depletion and ecosystem 
degradation. This is critically important when planning for a future with climate change 
and emerging social demands for aquatic ecosystem protection. 
Water pricing is the policy advocated by the European WFD. This policy poses 
important challenges in arid and semiarid regions such as Spain, where irrigation is the 
largest user of water, having strong links to a wide range of ecosystem services. The 
water pricing policy for managing drought is very detrimental to farmers. Implementing 
water pricing instead of water markets or institutional policies, increases farmers’ losses 
substantially by 80 and 100 million Euros under mild and severe drought, respectively. 
These benefit losses are the opportunity costs of the water pricing policy to 
farmers, and the steep opportunity costs of water pricing would surely lead to policy 
failure. The main empirical finding on water pricing is that farmers loose from half to 
two thirds of their private benefits when the water pricing policy is implemented during 
drought, instead of the water market or institutional policies. Enforcing water pricing 
will become a quite difficult task facing tough political and technical hurdles.  
The empirical results show that water market and institutional policies are much 
more feasible and equitable than water pricing, because water pricing involves 
disproportionate costs to farmers. There are also additional measures for these two 
policies that could enhance the protection of environmental flows. One measure is 
public water buyback programs for water markets, in order to reap the benefits of water 
markets while protecting ecosystems. The other measure is greening the cooperation in 
the institutional policy, by including the environment as a full stakeholder in the process 
of water allocation among sectors and spatial locations. However, protecting the 
environment with water pricing will require adding further “environmental” and 
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“resource use” costs to water prices (in WFD terminology), resulting in extreme 
disproportionate costs to farmers. 
Water management in the JRB is based on the negotiation and cooperation of 
stakeholders, which seems to provide a worthwhile prospect for sustainable water 
management in irrigation. In fact, this approach achieves better environmental outcomes 
compared to other policy instruments, and almost the same outcomes in terms of 
farmers’ private benefits and social benefits compared to water market policy. However, 
the institutional-based approach is not easy to implement in real-world situations. The 
reasons are that institutions may involve asymmetric negotiation power among the 
stakeholders, and also the severe scarcity of water resources may considerably reduce 
the incentives for cooperation. 
The evidence from the JRB highlights that, despite these limitations, the 
institutional-based approach was able to reduce environmental and economic damages 
during the last drought period, and to surrogate social conflicts by cooperation. The JRB 
experience suggests that the implementation of the institutional approach in managing 
water resources requires sufficient institutional capacity to deal with power asymmetry 
and resource scarcity, and available social capital supporting cooperation, which is 
particularly necessary for the promotion of self-regulation initiatives.     
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